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Abstract 
The objective of this Research Perspectives article is to promote policy change amongst journals, 
scholars and students with a vested interest in hypothetico-deductive information systems (IS) 
research. We are concerned about the design, analysis, reporting and reviewing of quantitative IS 
studies that draw on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). We observe that debates about 
misinterpretations, abuse, and issues with NHST, while having persisted for about half a century, 
remain largely absent in IS. We find this an untenable position for a discipline with a proud 
quantitative tradition. We discuss traditional and emergent threats associated with the application 
of NHST and examine how they manifest in recent IS scholarship. To encourage the 
development of new standards for NHST in hypothetico-deductive IS research, we develop a 
balanced account of possible actions that are implementable short-term or long-term and that 
incentivize or penalize specific practices. To promote an immediate push for change, we also 
develop two sets of guidelines that IS scholars can adopt right away.  
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NEW GUIDELINES FOR NULL HYPOTHESIS SIGNIFICANCE TESTING 
IN HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE IS RESEARCH 
“Statistical techniques for testing hypotheses – have 
more flaws than Facebook’s privacy policies.” 
Siegfried (2014) 
 
Introduction 
Our paper extends a conversation across several of our top journals (e.g., Burton-Jones & Lee, 
2017; Gregor & Klein, 2014; Grover & Lyytinen, 2015) that focuses on pushing a prominent 
information systems (IS) research tradition toward “a new state of play” (Grover & Lyytinen, 
2015)–namely positivist, quantitative research on basis of the hypothetico-deductive model to 
science (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p. 236). This conversation is bound to theory-based, quantitative 
empirical studies that seek to explain and predict IS phenomena (Gregor, 2006), which includes a 
large majority of IS research (Gregor, 2006; Grover & Lyytinen, 2015), such as survey and 
experimental research traditions. At the same time, it excludes several important traditions such 
as both interpretive and qualitative research, design science research, as well as some quantitative 
traditions such as purely data-driven predictive methods and analytical modeling.  
Like our colleagues before us, we see the need to constantly assess and revisit all aspects of our 
scholarship to ensure that we as a community constantly perform and improve on our 
fundamental mission, understanding how information systems can be effectively developed and 
deployed in the human enterprise.  
Moreover, like the contributions of our colleagues in this conversation, we have a specific focus: 
ours is the way the IS community1 apply null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) within the 
                                                 
1  I.e., the entire IS scholarly ecosystem of authors, reviewers, editors/publishers and educators/supervisors. 
hypothetico-deductive tradition. NHST is a method of statistical inference by which an 
hypothesized factor is tested against a hypothesis of no effect or relationship on basis of 
empirical observations (Pernet, 2016). NHST is the dominant statistical approach in use in 
science today (Gigerenzer, 2004) and broadly permeates through society. For example, the 
concept p-value – a key component of the NHST lexicon – features in statistics or algebra 
courses in schools in many countries since the 1930s, and is part of SAT testing in the United 
States at least since the 1990s. 
The proposal we make in this paper details changes to the way we apply NHST in hypothetico-
deductive research in IS. We argue making this proposal is important because it affects research 
practices employed by large parts of the IS community. The issue, we argue, is not necessarily 
vested in NHST, but in ourselves.2 We argue that the way NHST is used in the research practices 
employed in our ecosystem of authors, reviewers, editors/publishers and educators has become 
so deeply rooted and ritualized that it formed normed habits that are difficult to break. This is a 
potential threat to IS research on two counts: first, some practices in applying NHST (such as the 
use and interpretation of the p-value) have always been susceptible to misunderstanding and 
misuse (e.g., Cohen, 1994; Dixon, 2003; Fisher, 1955; Lang, Rothman, & Cann, 1998; Neyman 
& Pearson, 1928). Second, changes to the phenomena and research settings in which IS 
scholarship is situated (such as the advent of digital population data or the emergence of 
computational advances to data analysis, e.g., Berente, Seidel, & Safadi, 2019; Freelon, 2014; 
Lazer et al., 2009) have begun to challenge incumbent practices; some have led to the emergence 
of questionable research practices that skirt the line between ethical and unethical rather than 
being blatant misconduct (O'Boyle Jr., Banks, & Gonzalez-Mulé, 2017). 
We also argue making our proposal is timely. Conversations around the correct application of 
NHST in the sciences date back to its origin in the proposals for significance testing by R.A. 
                                                 
2  We will also discuss some of the problems inherent to NHST but our clear focus is on our own fallibilities and 
how they could be mitigated. 
Fisher (1935b) on the one hand and for acceptance based on critical rejection regions by J. 
Neyman and E.S. Pearson (1928, 1933) on the other hand. Still, several recent developments 
have reinvigorated this debate, which has paradoxically remained both rampant and dormant for 
decades. For example, 
1. the movement to quantify academic productivity and outcomes through journal rankings and 
citation analysis since the early 2000s as part of the now well established “publish or perish” 
mantra has demonstratedly led to the emergence of several questionable research practices 
such as HARKing or p-Hacking (Kerr, 1998; O'Boyle Jr. et al., 2017; Simonsohn, Nelson, & 
Simmons, 2014; Starbuck, 2016); 
2. the open science movement, i.e., the idea that all scientific knowledge elements (including 
publications, data, physical samples, and software) should be openly shared as early as is 
practical in the discovery process (Nielsen, 2011), while dating back hundreds of years 
(David, 2004), has over the past ten years advanced rapidly on the basis of internet 
technologies providing a range of novel services including data sharing platforms, 
computationally-intensive data analytics, crowdsourcing for project funding, open access 
publishing, data and publication archiving, and others; 
3. the unfolding and increasing availability of large-scale volumes of digital trace data 
(Freelon, 2014; Howison, Wiggins, & Crowston, 2011) through the increasingly ubiquitous 
digitalization of everyday life (Vodanovich, Sundaram, & Myers, 2010; Yoo, 2010) has led 
to a vast increase in opportunities to conduct studies with extremely large organic sample 
sizes, which draws into doubt statistical practices historically used to draw inferences from 
small-sample populations (Lin, Lucas Jr., & Shmueli, 2013; Starbuck, 2016; Xu, Zhang, & 
Zhou, 2019); 
4. advances in computational approaches to data analytics and statistical software packages 
with respect to interfaces, computational power and usability have led to a vast increase in 
popularity and application (e.g., Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, & Mena, 2012; Ringle, Sarstedt, & 
Straub, 2012) and allow researchers to easily sift repeatedly through data in search of patterns 
(Bettis, 2012). This has led some to argue that the increase in application of such methods has 
not been matched with a similar attention to methodological details (e.g., Rönkkö & 
Evermann, 2013; Rönkkö, McIntosh, Antonakis, & Edwards, 2016); and 
5. the “replication crisis” (Open Science Collaboration, 2015; The Economist, 2013; Yong, 
2012) has led to renewed and heightened skepticism about commonly used statistical 
procedures, as well as confirmation, positivity, and publication bias, which traversed from 
psychology to virtually all disciplines in the social sciences. In the IS field, it has led to the 
establishment of a dedicated journal, the AIS Transactions on Replication Research (Dennis 
& Valacich, 2015; Saunders et al., 2017).3 
Finally, we argue that making our proposal is relevant to the IS field. While some of the above 
developments (e.g., the publish or perish movement, the replication crisis) are not restricted to 
the IS field alone, several others, in particular the advent of digital trace data, the rise of 
computational approaches to data analytics, and the continued emergence of technologically-
enabled open science initiatives, speak fundamentally to the core phenomena in our field.4  
We develop our proposal as follows. We first review NHST and its role in the hypothetico-
deductive model to science. We review historic and emergent threats that relate to how NHST is 
applied in this scientific model. We then analyze the 100 most impactful recent papers in our top 
journals to identify whether NHST is commonly applied in leading IS scholarship and whether 
indicators exist that the discussed threats also occur in our field. We then make suggestions for 
the IS field for moving forward with the application of NHST, with the view to stimulate 
reflection and change. We detail proposals for how we theorize for statistical testing, how we use 
                                                 
3  Remarkably, contrary to several fields, the experiences at the AIS Transactions on Replication Research after 
three years of publishing replication research has been that a meaningful proportion of research replications 
have produced results that are essentially the same as the original study (Dennis, Brown, Wells, & Rai, 2018). 
4  This trend is evidenced, for example, in the emergent number of IS research articles on these topics in our 
own journals (e.g., Berente et al., 2019; Howison et al., 2011; Levy & Germonprez, 2017; Lukyanenko, 
Parsons, Wiersma, & Maddah, 2019). 
statistics for analysis, how we report results, and how we publish. We also detail two concrete 
sets of guidelines that our field can adopt right away. 
NHST and its role in the traditional hypothetico-deductive research cycle 
The point of this paper is neither to describe the origin and development of the hypothetico-
deductive research cycle and its use of NHST in detail, nor to focus on the perceived or actual 
weaknesses of NHST as a technique in isolation. There are several accounts of the origin and 
evolution of NHST as a heuristic method of inference (e.g., Pernet, 2016; Szucs & Ioannidis, 
2017) as well as a multitude of reviews and analyses of various properties of the technique itself 
(e.g., Amrhein, Greenland, & McShane, 2019; Branch, 2014; Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). For 
the point of the paper, we provide an idealized account of a typical research process so that we 
can illustrate where potentially problematic practices involving NHST have always existed or 
recently emerged. We do so because such practices can threaten the efficiency, validity and 
robustness of the hypothetico-deductive research cycle. Figure 1 shows a stylized version of the 
hypothetico-deductive research cycle. 
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Figure 1: Characteristics of, and threats to, the hypothetico-deductive research 
cycle 
 
Studies on basis of the hypothetico-deductive model to science typically proceed in six stages: 
1) Researchers posit a new theory in the form of one or more hypotheses (e.g., people with 
small hands type faster). 
2) They design an empirical study to obtain data (e.g., measures of typing speed and hand 
size). 
3) They collect the data from a sample (e.g., a group of students).  
4) They attempt to corroborate the hypotheses, by analyzing the gathered data and 
calculating some test statistic (e.g., a t-test comparing typing speed of those with large 
hands to those with small hands). They calculate a probability, the p-value, under the 
specified statistical model, that a particular test statistic (e.g., the average typing speed) 
would be equal to or more extreme than its observed value, while assuming that some 
logical rival hypothesis is true in the population (e.g., people with small and large hands 
type at the same speed). This rival hypothesis is referred to as the null hypothesis, 
because it typically assumes the absence of an effect (e.g., no difference in typing speed). 
The p-value—the probability of finding the difference in typing speed that we found in 
our sample, or a larger difference, if we assume that there is no difference in the 
population—is then usually compared to certain thresholds (typically 0.05 or 0.01). 
5) They interpret the results from the statistical tests. If the null hypothesis is rejected, 
researchers typically construe this result as denoting “accept” or “support” for the 
hypothesis stated at the beginning (e.g., people with small hands indeed type faster). 
6) Finally, they submit a report detailing theory, study design and outcomes to a scientific 
peer-reviewed journal for publication. 
The use of practices associated with NHST is deeply engrained in this scientific model. Not only 
is NHST the dominant approach to statistical data analysis as described above (Gigerenzer, 2004; 
Hubbard, 2004; Lin et al., 2013), NHST also forms the logical basis for most hypothesis 
development (Edwards & Berry, 2010; Lee & Hubona, 2009). Identifying samples that yield 
sufficient statistical power for NHST is a key component during study design (Baroudi & 
Orlikowski, 1989; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Axel, 2007; Goodhue, Lewis, & Thompson, 2007), 
and data collection procedures involve several techniques for increasing statistical properties 
relevant for NHST, such as sample size (Sivo, Saunders, Chang, & Jiang, 2006). Finally, result 
interpretation and reporting also commonly follow recommendations that relate to NHST, either 
in the form of validation guidelines (Gefen, Rigdon, & Straub, 2011; Straub, 1989; Straub, 
Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004) or in the form of entire scripts, i.e., institutionalized patterns for 
knowledge creation and dissemination (Grover & Lyytinen, 2015; Tams & Straub, 2010). 
The story goes that this way of using NHST within the hypothetico-deductive process was based 
on an intellectual debate, a misunderstanding of that debate, and a matter of convenience 
(Branch, 2014; Gigerenzer, 2004; Greenland et al., 2016; Lehmann, 1993). The debate mainly 
took place in the first half of the 20th century between Fisher (e.g., 1935a, 1935b; 1955) on the 
one hand, and Neyman and Pearson (e.g., 1928, 1933) on the other hand. Fisher introduced the 
idea of significance testing involving the probability p to quantify the chance of a certain event or 
state occurring, while Neyman and Pearson introduced the idea of accepting a hypothesis based 
on critical rejection regions. Fisher’s idea is essentially an approach based on proof by 
contradiction (Christensen, 2005; Pernet, 2016): we pose a null model and test if our data 
conforms to it. This computation yields the probability of observing a result at least as extreme as 
a test statistic (e.g. a t value), assuming the null hypothesis of the null model (no effect) is true. 
This probability reflects the conditional, cumulative probability of achieving the observed 
outcome or larger: p(Obs≥t|H0). Neyman and Pearson’s idea was a framework of two hypotheses: 
the null hypothesis of no effect and the alternative hypothesis of an effect, together with 
controlling the probabilities of making errors. This idea introduced the notions of control of error 
rates, and of critical intervals. Together, these notions allow distinguishing type-I (rejecting H0 
when there is no effect) and type-II errors (not rejecting H0 when there is an effect). 
While both parties disagreed with each other’s approach, a blend between both emerged as the 
now dominant approach to testing hypotheses (Lehmann, 1993). It is said that this occurred 
because scientists were in need of clear heuristics and were likely confused by the ongoing 
debate, and created a usable blend (Field, 2013; Reinhart, 2015). It is this “blend” of practices 
that emerged in the application of NHST, more so than properties of NHST itself, which is at the 
core of concerns in several disciplines, and should also be critically reflected upon in IS.  
It is important here to declare that we do not mean to discredit the hypothetico-deductive model 
per se. In fact, like many of our colleagues, we have ourselves followed this model many times 
and benefitted from the advantages it provides: 
- a strong foundation for building a cumulative knowledge tradition, 
- means for both novel theory generation and incremental theoretical advance through 
intension and extension (Burton-Jones, Recker, Indulska, Green, & Weber, 2017; Kaplan, 
1998/1964), 
- means for comparison and reproduction of study results across different settings and 
samples, 
- a shared language that is common to scientists across many fields, and 
- cognitive advantages for both authors and readers in creating and assessing knowledge 
creation and the scripts we produce. 
Yet, we believe that it is healthy to constantly revisit our scholarship procedures and ask whether 
normed habits and practices remain effective and efficient vehicles in light of new theory, 
empirics and ongoing changes to knowledge transfer mechanisms. Therefore, the analysis that 
follows focuses on what practices exist in using NHST in this model and the threats for 
knowledge creation efficiency, validity and robustness that flow from these practices. 
Threats stemming from the application of NHST in the hypothetico-deductive 
research cycle 
NHST has been controversial since its inception (e.g., Branch, 2014; Gigerenzer, 2004; 
Greenland et al., 2016) but recent developments have amplified some of the traditional concerns 
and saw new concerns emerge. We start by first reviewing traditional threats to research that 
stem from the application of NHST that have persisted over time, before then discussing 
emergent threats that have come to the forefront only or particularly in recent years. We discuss 
both types of threats and the potential risks associated with them in some detail, noting that even 
broader accounts of these threats are available in the literature (Amrhein et al., 2019; Baker, 
2016; Branch, 2014; Christensen, 2005; Dixon, 2003; Gelman & Stern, 2006; Gigerenzer, 2004; 
Greenland et al., 2016; McShane & Gal, 2017; Meehl, 1978; Munafò et al., 2017; Nickerson, 
2000; Reinhart, 2015; Schwab, Abrahamson, Starbuck, & Fidler, 2011; Szucs & Ioannidis, 2017; 
Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016).5  
Traditional Threat 1: NHST is difficult to understand and often misinterpreted. NHST 
builds on the p-value measure, which is arguably a sophisticated statistic because it provides an 
approach to summarizing the incompatibility between a particular set of data and a proposed 
model for the data. The most common context for applying NHST is a model describing 
hypotheses, constructed under a set of assumptions, together with the null hypothesis. However, 
applying NHST in this way typically involves construing double negatives and null hypotheses 
that are by design meant to be obviously false. Key terms such as “statistical significance” and 
“p-value” are demonstrably often misconstrued (Amrhein et al., 2019; Cohen, 1994; Greenland et 
al., 2016; Haller & Kraus, 2002; McShane & Gal, 2017; Reinhart, 2015). Several 
misinterpretations are particularly common: The p-value is not an indication of the strength or 
magnitude of an effect (Haller & Kraus, 2002). Any interpretation of the p-value in relation to the 
effect under study (strength, reliability, probability) is wrong, since p-values speak only about the 
null hypothesis. In addition, while p-values are randomly distributed (if all the assumptions of the 
test are met) when there is no effect, their distribution depends on both the population effect size 
and the number of participants, making it impossible to infer the strength of an effect from them. 
Similarly, 1-p is not the probability of replicating an effect (Cohen, 1994). Often, a small p-value 
is considered to indicate a strong likelihood of getting the same results on another try, but again 
this cannot be obtained because the p-value is not informative about the effect itself (Miller, 
                                                 
5  To illustrate the magnitude of the conversation: In June 2019, The American Statistician published a special 
issue on null hypothesis significance testing that contains 43 articles on the topic (Wasserstein, Schirm, & 
Lazar, 2019). 
2009). Because the p-value depends on the number of subjects, it can only be used in high-
powered studies to interpret results. In low powered studies, the p-value has a large variance 
across repeated samples. A p-value also is not an indication favoring a given hypothesis (Szucs 
& Ioannidis, 2017). Because a low p-value only indicates a misfit of the null hypothesis to the 
data, it cannot be taken as evidence in favor of a specific alternative hypothesis more than any 
other possible alternatives such as measurement error and selection bias (Gelman, 2013). In fact, 
it is likely that the proportion of false positive findings in NHST-based studies is much greater 
than assumed (Nuzzo, 2014; Szucs & Ioannidis, 2017). The p-value also does not describe the 
probability of the null hypothesis p(H0) being true (Schwab et al., 2011). This common 
misconception arises from a confusion between the probability of an observation given the null 
p(Obs≥t|H0) and the probability of the null given an observation p(H0|Obs≥t) that is then taken as 
an indication for p(H0). 
The only correct interpretation is that a p-value indicates the probability of obtaining the 
observed result or anything more extreme than that actually observed in the available sample 
data, assuming that (1) the null-hypothesis holds true in the population (by design largely an 
invalid assumption) and (2) all underlying model and test assumptions are met (e.g., random 
sampling, independence of sampled units, normality of distributions) (McShane & Gal, 2017). 
The possible risk associated with incorrectly interpreting NHST is that researchers may either 
disregard evidence that fails to attain statistical significance or undervalue it relative to evidence 
that purportedly attains it, in turn leading to ill-informed judgments based on the evaluation of 
evidence (McShane & Gal, 2017). Interventions or treatments designed based on incorrectly 
interpreted evidence can lack effectiveness or even be harmful. Also, spurious findings may be 
published leading to diffusion of unsubstantiated theoretical claims. 
Traditional Threat 2: NHST is sensitive to sampling strategy and sample size. The logic of 
NHST builds strongly on an appropriate sampling strategy. NHST logic demands random 
sampling because results from statistical analyses conducted on a sample are used to draw 
conclusions about the population. If samples are not drawn independently from measured 
variables and either selected randomly or selected to represent the population precisely, the 
conclusions drawn from NHST are not valid because it is impossible to correct for sampling bias, 
which statistical significance testing assumes is non-existent (Leahey, 2005). Yet, it is common 
practice to forego this requirement (Leahey, 2005; Starbuck, 2013). 
With large enough sample sizes, a statistically significant rejection of a null hypothesis can be 
highly probable even if the underlying discrepancy in the examined statistics (e.g., the 
differences in means) is substantively trivial (Smith, Fahey, & Smucny, 2014). Sample size 
sensitivity occurs in NHST with so-called point-null hypotheses (Edwards & Berry, 2010), i.e., 
predictions expressed as point values. While such types of hypotheses are desired in the natural 
sciences (Szucs & Ioannidis, 2017, pp. 10-11), in social sciences, such as management, 
psychology or information systems, they lead to the paradox of stronger research designs 
yielding weaker tests because most hypotheses are specified as directional statements (such as a 
positive or negative relationship between two variables), where the point-null hypothesis 
describes the absence of a correlation, mean or variance difference (Schwab et al., 2011). A 
researcher that gathers a large enough sample can then reject basically any point-null hypothesis 
because the confidence interval around the null effect becomes smaller (Lin et al., 2013). 
The possible risk is that with large sample sizes, applications of NHST lead to worse inferences 
(Meehl, 1967). Depending on the type of sampling strategy, especially in observational studies, it 
can be near impossible to control for the relationship of all irrelevant variables that are correlated 
with the variables of interest, which can lead to the identification of many correlations that can be 
mistaken as revealing true relationships (Bruns & Ioannidis, 2016) and in computing biased and 
inconsistent estimations of effects. 
Traditional Threat 3: NHST logic is incomplete. NHST rests on the formulation of a null 
hypothesis and its test against a particular set of data. This tactic relies on the so-called modus 
tollens (denying the consequence) (Cohen, 1994), a much used logic in both positivist and 
interpretive research in IS (Lee & Hubona, 2009). While modus tollens is logically correct, 
problems arise when it neglects pre-data probabilities: An example illustrates the error: if a 
person is a researcher, it is very likely she does not publish in MISQ [null hypothesis]; this 
person published in MISQ [observation], so she is probably not a researcher [conclusion]. This 
logic is, evidently, flawed.6 In other words, the logic that allows for the falsification of a theory 
loses its validity when uncertainty and/or pre-data probabilities are included in the premises, yet 
both uncertainty (e.g., about true population parameters) and pre-data probabilities (pre-existent 
correlations between any set of variables) is at the very core null hypothesis significance testing 
as applied in the social sciences, especially when used in single research designs (such as one 
survey or experiment) (Falk & Greenbaum, 1995): in social reality, no two variables are ever 
perfectly unrelated (Meehl, 1967). 
A second manifestation of incomplete logic is that NHST neglects predictions under H1 (Szucs & 
Ioannidis, 2017). A widespread misconception is that rejecting H0 allows accepting a specific H1 
(Nickerson, 2000). But NHST does not require a specification of the data that H1 would predict, 
it only computes probabilities conditional on H0. Rejection of H0 thus offers no insight about 
how well the data might fit a general or specific H1. 
The possible risk associated with incomplete NHST logic beyond conceptual confusion and 
generation of misleading inferences is that it entices researchers to judge theories as better or 
                                                 
6  An excellent analogous example using the relationship between mammograms and likelihood of breast cancer 
is provided by Gigerenzer, Gaissmeyer, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, and Woloshin (2008) in more detail. 
worse even in the absence of direct comparisons to alternative theories. It also favors vaguely 
defined hypotheses because these are harder to definitely assess against credible alternatives. It 
makes it difficult and unlikely that theories are ever conclusively falsified (Edwards & Berry, 
2010).  
Traditional Threat 4: NHST fosters selective threshold-based reporting. p-value thresholds 
such as < 0.05 or even < 0.001 were never intended to be used as a basis for making ‘pass or fail’ 
decisions (Fisher, 1955). Neither Neyman and Pearson (1933) nor Fisher (1955) intended for the 
p-value to become a firm basis for accepting or rejecting hypotheses—let alone the only basis. 
Neyman and Pearson (1933, p. 291) wrote: “no test based upon the theory of probability can by 
itself provide any valuable evidence of the truth or falsehood of that hypothesis”. Rather, they 
proposed that p-values could help in reducing the chance of Type I and Type II errors: 
“we may look at the purpose of tests from another view-point. Without hoping to know whether 
each separate hypothesis is true or false, we may search for rules to govern our behavior with 
regard to them, in following which we insure that, in the long run of experience, we shall not be 
too often wrong.” 
Neyman and Pearson (1928, p. 205) did passingly use a probability of five percent in one of their 
examples and as one of multiple arguments for why the tested hypothesis may best be rejected, 
and Fisher (1935a) did at some point argue that results with higher than 5% or even 1% 
probability should not be seen as ‘unexpected’ and therefore simply be ignored – the original 
intention was merely to use the term statistical significance to indicate that a particular result 
warrants further inspection. Although Fisher (1955) later changed his mind again, by that time 
scholars had already started using these fixed thresholds, thereby gradually solidifying the cut-off 
and reducing the importance of other arguments. Notably, in the social sciences, the vast majority 
of papers by now focus on statistically significant results (Szucs & Ioannidis, 2017), often not 
fully or not entirely disclosing information about results that do not meet the commonly 
established thresholds.  
The possible risk of threshold-based reporting is that the publication of “negative” or 
“insignificant” results is impeded, which leads to publication bias, the systematic suppression of 
research findings due to small magnitude, statistical insignificance, or contradiction of prior 
findings or theory (Harrison, Banks, Pollack, O’Boyle, & Short, 2014). 
Emergent Threat 1: NHST is susceptible to questionable research practices. Shifts in 
academic culture, the availability of scholarly performance metrics and regulatory moves toward 
measuring research impact have created ample pressures on academics to publish “significant” 
contributions (Starbuck, 2016) to meet expectations for promotion and tenure (Dennis, Valacich, 
Fuller, & Schneider, 2006) and demonstrate research impact (Lyytinen, Baskerville, Iivari, & 
Te'Eni, 2007). One consequence of these pressures has been the emergence of a dominant type of 
research design where directional hypotheses are proposed alongside null hypotheses that claim 
there is no effect. This type of research design has been referred to as the “mid-range script”, 
which is a legitimate, popular, reasonable and safe way of constructing knowledge with good 
prospects of publishability (Grover & Lyytinen, 2015, p. 279), but which also limits richer 
theorizing, constrains the freedom in relating theory and empirics, and weakens alternative forms 
of knowledge construction, such as data-driven research or blue ocean theorizing (Grover & 
Lyytinen, 2015, p. 285). 
A second consequence of the publication pressure in academic culture is the growing prevalence 
of so-called questionable research practices (Bedeian, Taylor, & Miller, 2010; O'Boyle Jr. et al., 
2017) that skirt the line between ethical and unethical behavior. The adoption of these practices 
is often understated but evidence amounts that they are prevalent in academia today (Bedeian et 
al., 2010; Kerr, 1998; O'Boyle Jr. et al., 2017; Starbuck, 2016). 
The most prominent behaviors have become known under labels such as p-Hacking 
(manipulating, transforming, testing, and analyzing data until some statistically significant result 
emerges) and HARKing (Hypothesizing After Results are Known) although others also exist 
(O'Boyle Jr. et al., 2017). P-Hacking involves subjecting data to many calculations or 
manipulations in search for an equation that yields strong patterns. HARKing means presenting a 
post hoc hypothesis in a research report as if it were an a priori hypothesis (e.g., in the 
introduction) (Kerr, 1998). HARKing treads a fine line between theory-testing and theory-
generating research because there are several variations to it depending on whether hypotheses 
were in fact anticipated and/or plausible (Kerr, 1998). 
The possible risk is that p-Hacking can turn any false hypothesis into one that has statistically 
significant support, i.e., that false positive results are published, which could lead to scholars 
spending scarce resources chasing down false leads, and organizations and institutions 
implementing ineffective or even harmful policies (Nelson, Simmons, & Simonsohn, 2018). 
HARKing invalidates the idea of a priori hypothesis generation and subsequent testing and can 
lead to distorted publications limited to ideas and findings, without a faithful representation of 
the scientific process through which these ideas were born, which skews the image of science to 
students and the public audience. HARKing also risks increasing levels of type-I errors: if one 
attempts (too) many post-hoc analyses on the same data, some tests will generate false positives 
simply by chance (Szucs & Ioannidis, 2017). This runs the risk of misconstruing hypotheses that 
predicted false positives as theory to account for what is effectively an illusory effect. It also 
risks favoring weaker theories that post hoc accommodate results rather than correctly predict 
them, which in turns promotes developing narrow theory at the expense of broader, richer 
theorizing, and inhibits the generation of plausible alternative hypotheses. 
Emergent Threat 2: NHST is unfit for many studies involving big data or digital trace data. 
The emergence of big data (Chen, Chiang, & Storey, 2012; George, Haas, & Pentland, 2014) and 
the growing prevalence of digital trace data – evidence of activities and events that is logged and 
stored digitally (Freelon, 2014, p. 59) – increasingly allow researchers to obtain very large 
amounts of data, often to the point that the data collected resembles entire populations or at least 
very large fractions of populations.7 Yet, NHST originally was conceived as a small-sample 
statistical inference technique (Meehl, 1967). In contexts involving digital trace population-level 
data, statistical inferences are increasingly meaningless because parameters of the data closely or 
fully resemble parameters of the studied populations (Starbuck, 2013). Likewise, in contexts 
involving big data, samples are dramatically statistically over-powered (Szucs & Ioannidis, 2017) 
leading to worse inferences (Lin et al., 2013). 
The possible risks associated with NHST in studies involving big data is that it can lead 
researchers to claim support for statistically significant results that are not practically significant 
(Lin et al., 2013). The risk with digital trace data is that it is often generated organically,  not 
following an explicit research design, which increases the likelihood of undermining the 
robustness of findings through potential errors in algorithmic outputs and in parametric and 
procedural choices for data processing. The opaqueness of the generation of digital trace data 
also threatens construct and internal validity (Xu et al., 2019). 
How pervasive is NHST in hypothetico-deductive IS research? 
We wanted to ascertain whether the discussed threats stemming from the application of NHST 
matter to the IS community, so we decided to collect data about their prevalence in our own field. 
Our reasoning was that if we can demonstrate that NHST is a commonly applied technique in IS 
research, it is important that our field engages in critical review and debate about the threats and 
possible risks associated with NHST. 
                                                 
7  See Lin et al. (2013) for several examples. 
We proceeded as follows. We reviewed 100 top cited papers in the senior scholar basket of eight 
IS journals between 2013 and 2016. Appendix A provides details about our procedures. We do 
not mean to claim that this is an exhaustive or representative sample of research papers in IS. 
Still, the papers’ high citation counts suggest that other authors take inspiration for their own 
research from these papers. The reputation of the outlets and the citation count of the papers also 
suggest that they are considered to be of high quality by the community. As such, we believe 
these papers will allow us to develop some insights into the accepted research culture in IS, the 
‘way we do things around here’. When we point out suboptimal practices in these papers, we do 
not in any way wish to incriminate the excellent scholars who produced and reviewed these 
papers. We use these papers to talk about our whole community. 
Of the 100 papers in our sample, 39 were quantitative research articles following the 
hypothetico-deductive model, a further two studies employed mixed method designs that 
involved quantitative empirical data collection and analysis in accordance to this model. Two 
additional design science papers involved quantitative data in the same vain. Our final sample 
was thus 43 papers. Of these, 15 employed surveys, followed by experiments, text mining and 
panel data studies (5 each). Six studies employed multiple types of data collections: two 
combined survey and experiment data, one combined experiment with interviews, and three 
combined surveys with either text mining, interviews or digital trace data. 
Both the raw data and our coded data (doi:10.25912/5cede0024b1e1), as well as the coding 
protocol (doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/2GKCS), are available online for open inspection and 
assessment. Appendix A1 summarizes frequency counts for selected coding categories but we 
urge all readers to consult the data directly. Table 1 summarizes the main observations from the 
coding of the 43 papers, grouped by stage of the hypothetico-deductive scientific cycle, together 
with our interpretations of these observations in relation to the above-discussed threats. In what 
follows, we will discuss the conclusions we drew from our inspection of the data. 
Table 1: Main findings from the coding of 43 published IS papers between 2013-2016 that follow the hypothetico-deductive model to science. 
Stage of the 
hypothetico-
deductive 
cycle 
Observations Our Interpretations 
1. Develop 
hypotheses 
38 of 43 papers state a-priori hypotheses. Two papers state hypotheses only in 
graphical form (as part of a research model). 
 
The largest share of hypotheses (13) are formulated as directional statements, followed 
by comparisons (6). Of 15 papers stating multiple forms of hypotheses, 10 involve 
directional statements.  
NHST is a frequently applied technique in IS scholarship. 
 
 
Indicative of emergent threat #1: our theories often involve 
directional predictions around a null value indicating no 
effect. Strong research designs potentially yield weak tests 
of such theories.  
2. Design 
study 
39 of the 43 papers use a research design common to the mid-range script (Grover & 
Lyytinen, 2015). Four papers reportedly use an exploratory study design. 
 
 
Three papers report research designs set up as tests of competing theoretical models. 
Indicative of emergent threat #1: the dominance of the mid-
range script (Grover & Lyytinen, 2015) limits alternative 
modes of rich, inductive theorizing. 
 
Indicative of traditional threats #1 and #3: only few papers 
predict alternative or competing H1. 
3. Collect 
data 
36 of 43 papers do not discuss statistical power during study design (2 papers report 
post-hoc power analyses). Four studies reportedly use power analysis for sampling. 
 
 
22 of 43 papers use convenience sampling, six use systematic sampling, and four 
random sampling. Nine studies collect entire population-level data. 
Indicative of traditional threat #2: it is common practice in 
IS scholarship to forego sampling and sample size 
requirements of NHST. 
 
Indicative of emergent threat #2: The studies involving big 
data or digital trace data in our sample draw on organically 
generated data (Xu et al., 2019) and do not adjust their 
statistical approach. 
4. Analyze 
data 
Across all 43 papers, 82% of hypotheses are reported as supported. The only study 
reporting less than 50% of supported hypotheses is the single replication study in the 
sample (none of eight hypotheses supported). 
 
Three papers consistently report exact p-values, eight papers do so selectively, 28 use 
threshold-based reporting. 
 
 
 
 
Indicative of traditional threat #4: threshold-based reporting 
occurs in IS scholarship.  
 
26 of 43 papers use R2 measures for effect size reporting. Two use standardized means 
difference scores. Four papers report multiple effect size measures, 10 report none. 
 
34 of 43 papers do not report confidence intervals in their results. Three do so 
consistently, two selectively. 
 
11 of 43 papers use post-hoc analyses. 
 
Indicative of traditional threat #1: estimations of strength or 
magnitude of discovered effects are neither always nor 
consistently reported in IS scholarship.  
5. Interpret 
results 
Three papers consistently refer to “statistical significance” when reporting on p-
values. Several papers explicitly interpret significance as importance or magnitude of 
an effect (see point 6 below). 
 
11 of 43 papers refer to p-values to point at the absence of an effect. 
 
Six of 43 papers use abductive reasoning in their interpretation of “unexpected 
results”. 
 
 
 
 
Indicative of traditional threat #1: Erroneous use and 
misinterpretation of NHST occur in IS scholarship. 
6. Report 
findings 
Almost all of the 43 papers contain language that declares hypotheses as 
supported/accepted or rejected on the basis of p-values exceeding a certain threshold. 
Consider the following examples (with modifications to mask identity): 
 
“Our results reveal that the extent of [independent variables] are significant 
antecedents of [dependent variable] and that [dependent variables] are all 
significant […] reactions to [independent variable]”. 
 
“Table 3 shows significant effects of [independent variable] on [dependent 
variable] at p < .01 for all […] cases, leading to strong support for H2a”. 
 
“The significance level of each path coefficient indicates that each hypothesized 
path is significant. This means that [independent variables] have a significant 
impact on [dependent variable]. In addition, [independent variables] are 
significant influencing factors for [dependent variables].” 
 
Of 20 papers in which some of the hypotheses are not supported by the data, seven 
papers refer to the statistically insignificant results as the basis for drawing explicit 
conclusions about the absence of an effect; four papers draw this conclusion 
Indicative of traditional threat #4: threshold-based reporting 
occurs in IS scholarship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicative of traditional threat #1: misinterpretations of 
NHST occur in IS scholarship. 
implicitly. We also found cases where a proposed hypothesis is in fact a null 
hypothesis, and rejecting it is interpreted as support: 
 
“Consistent with our expectations, none of the main effects of [independent variable] 
on [dependent variable 1] (β = valueβ1, t = valuet1) and [dependent variable 2] (β = 
valueβ2, t = valuet2) were significant”. 
 
“The results indicate that the interaction terms of [independent variable] and 
[independent variable] are not significantly related to [dependent variable]. 
Therefore, we conclude that [independent variables] do not play a moderating role in 
the relationship between [independent variable] and [dependent variable].” 
We draw two main conclusions from the observations and our interpretations in Table 1: First, 
we believe that the data shows that NHST is a well-established technique in hypothetico-
deductive IS research. Second, we believe the data shows signs that the threats associated with 
NHST also have at least some level of occurrence in IS scholarship. Most of the hypothetico-
deductive IS papers in our sample follow the common mid-range script (Grover & Lyytinen, 
2015) and explicitly state a priori hypotheses, designed with binary decisions (accept vs. reject) 
and the absence of no effect in mind (Edwards & Berry, 2010). We also note that in much of the 
hypothesis development in IS papers, directional statements dominate and more precise non-
point value or non-directional alternatives are scarce, which may indicate a lack of theoretical 
precision.  
During study design and data collection, we note a lack of attention to statistical requirements of 
NHST such as random sampling – used in less than ten percent of articles in our sample. We also 
note that the large-sample studies within our sample used NHST for inference testing without 
making adjustments such as finite sample-size correction or avoiding inference statistics (such as 
p-values) altogether. Moreover, considerations related to statistical power, by and large, were not 
an explicit criterion in the study reports in our sample.  
During data analysis and interpretation, we believe there is evidence to suggest that threshold-
based reporting is prevalent in IS scholarship. We also found instances where the usage of 
statistical significance and p-values confuse statistical and practical significance (Lee, Mohajeri, 
& Hubona, 2017).  For example, if we find that the unstandardized regression coefficient for the 
effect of perceived ease of use on perceived usefulness is .116, this means that someone scoring 
one point closer to the ‘strongly agree’ side of a 7-point Likert-type response scale for perceived 
ease of use, scores .116 points closer to 7 for perceived usefulness. This effect may be 
“statistically significant”, but it is hardly practically meaningful.  
We also find that analyses often rely largely on p-values alone. As can be seen in our coded data 
(https://doi.org/10.25912/5cede0024b1e1), only few reports in our sample make use of 
contextualized information, such as confidence intervals, effect sizes, post-hoc analyses, plots 
and graphs, and power. Admittedly, of course, examples to the contrary also exist in our sample 
(e.g., Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, 2013; Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Lu, Ba, Huang, & Feng, 
2013; Mithas, Tafti, & Mitchell, 2013; Rishika, Kumar, Janakiraman, & Bezawada, 2013; Zeng 
& Wei, 2013). We found only six instances of papers where we interpreted the language as being 
indicative of abductive reasoning coupled with post-hoc analyses to make sense of purportedly 
“unexpected” results.  
Finally, we believe that result reporting in our field shows similar signs of publication bias as in 
other fields (e.g., Harrison et al., 2014). The average support for the hypotheses in our sample 
(82%) seems disproportionately high (Edwards & Berry, 2010, p. 669), especially when 
considering that this figure includes the one replication study that found none of its eight 
hypotheses supported. This situation could be seen as an indicator that our review practices are 
biased toward “statistically significant” results (Emerson et al., 2010) although further research is 
needed to examine this speculation. 
Proposing A Way Forward 
Whilst our motivation was to scrutinize prevalence and potential threats in the use of NHST in IS 
research, we are not the first to examine issues in hypothetico-deductive IS research. Many 
broader issues discussed in our community relate to our proposal. For example, IS scholars have 
called for an increased emphasis on method and data triangulation, testing assumptions, using a 
balanced set of metrics including measures of model fit and effect sizes, and considering the 
magnitude of effects as well as their significance (Gerow, Grover, Roberts, & Thatcher, 2010; 
MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 2011; Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013). The “mid-range 
script” and its typical statistically testable model has been challenged as a mode of knowledge 
construction; Grover and Lyytinen (2015) call for either more theoretically or practically oriented 
epistemic scripts. Moreover, there has already been a push for theory testing to go beyond 
‘effect’ and ‘prediction’ testing, and for equal weight to be given to statistical significance and 
‘practical significance’ (Lee et al., 2017). Others have highlighted the danger of Type I errors 
(‘false positives’) when sample sizes are large (Lin et al., 2013) and when reviewing papers 
(Straub, 2008), and discussed challenges relating to measurement (Bagozzi, 2011; Burton-Jones 
& Lee, 2017) and generalization (Lee & Baskerville, 2003; Tsang & Williams, 2012). However, 
none of these or any other papers in IS that we have seen thus far have explicitly examined the 
validity of the practices surrounding the application of NHST and its core elements such as 
proposing, accepting and rejecting hypotheses on the basis of p-values.  
While this debate has not yet occurred in our own field, it is certainly alive in several other 
disciplines. The recent attention to the p-value debate in Science and Nature (Baker, 2016; 
McNutt, 2016; Nuzzo, 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015) show that it is a timely issue, 
and one that has the potential to endanger cumulative knowledge traditions (Johnson, Payne, 
Wang, Asher, & Mandal, 2017; Wasserstein et al., 2019). 
We believe it is important for IS scholars to join the debate and help push toward new solutions. 
To identify an entry point into this debate, we collected and inspected proposals made in 
scientific disciplines that also follow the hypothetico-deductive model, such as psychology 
(Johnson et al., 2017; Trafimow & Marks, 2015; Tryon, Patelis, Chajewski, & Lewis, 2017), 
biology (Madden, Shah, & Esker, 2015; Nakagawa & Cuthill, 2007), epidemiology (Greenland et 
al., 2016), biomedicine (Twa, 2016), strategic and operations management (Bettis, Ethiraj, 
Gambardella, Helfat, & Mitchell, 2016; Guide Jr. & Ketokivi, 2015), organization science 
(Schwab et al., 2011), management science (O'Boyle Jr. et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2019), and 
statistical science (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). 
When inspecting the proposals made in these fields, we noticed that there was both consensus 
and substantial variance in the proposals made. For example, in strategic and operations 
management, the Strategic Management Journal made two moves in 2016: first, it started 
welcoming replications and non-results as a primary type of contribution in top-level journals; 
and second, it no longer accepted papers for publication that refer to cut-off levels of statistical 
significance (Bettis et al., 2016). We suggest these two proposals differ in terms of level of 
programming: A weakly programmed proposal (e.g., welcoming replications a contribution 
befitting top level journals) is a move that incentivizes and encourages particularly desirable 
behaviors. A strongly programmed proposal (e.g., rejecting papers that use statistical 
significance thresholds in their argumentation) penalizes particularly undesirable behavior.  
This distinction of weakly and strongly programmed proposals was also evident elsewhere. For 
example, in psychology, the journal Basic and Applied Social Psychology banned the use and 
reporting of p-values altogether (Trafimow & Marks, 2015) – a strongly programmed proposal. 
In organization science, Schwab et al. (2011) encourage researchers to include measures of 
uncertainty in their reporting, such as likelihood ratios, posterior probability distributions, or 
entire distributions of inferences – a weakly programmed proposal. 
A second distinction we found useful is the implementation timeframe (short-term to long-term). 
Some proposals to better NHST-related practices can readily be implemented in the short-term 
by making adjustments, for example, to statistical reporting standards, or by implementing 
confirmatory signoffs during paper submissions to journals; whilst other proposals require long-
term investments or cultural/institutional changes, such as the inclusion of alternative types of 
contributions welcomed by top level journals, the provision of independent methodological 
support or coaching in statistical methods, or the change in review modes to include results-blind 
reviewing (Locascio, 2019). 
With these two distinctions, we developed an overview of the range of possible actions that the 
IS community could pursue in moving forward (Table 2). We explain each possible course of 
action by detailing the change proposal it entails, the likely outcomes and implications from its 
adoption with regard to the discussed NHST-associated threats, and the primary stakeholder 
group implicated (i.e., authors, reviewers, publishers and/or policy makers).  
The proposals in Table 2 are practical and implementable. They are also backed with an 
increasing amount of evidence about their effectiveness (e.g., Munafò et al., 2017; Starbuck, 
2016) that has been accrued through meta-research that examines scientific practices, develops 
and tests alternatives (e.g., Ioannidis, Fanelli, Drunne, & Goodman, 2015). 
We do not suggest implementing all these proposals, let alone all at once. Our intent is merely to 
show that there is a range of options available to our field in moving forward, depending on our 
aptitude for penalties or incentives, and our willingness to move fast or slow. But we take the 
position that change we must. Formed habits are difficult to break at the best of times, and 
defective practices hard to stop. Change will also have to be implemented and accepted at all 
levels of our scholarly ecosystem. Changes in designing studies, analyzing data, writing or 
reviewing papers alone will not have the desired effect if they are not accompanied with an 
ecosystem-wide understanding of what qualifies as “good” research. This is why, by explicating 
choices for the different stakeholder groups, our proposal gives options to authors to engage in 
practices they find laudable to adopt (e.g., using pre-registrations). Our proposal also gives 
impetus for journals and publishers to strongly program certain behaviors. For example, 
proposals such as reporting number of statistical tests, confirming independent methodological 
oversight or declaring development of hypotheses truly a priori, could all be implemented in 
journal manuscript management systems (e.g., by configuring ScholarOne) during paper 
submission, much in the same vein we require authors to confirm ethical conduct. Finally, other 
proposals we include in Table 2 (such as developing standardized reporting checklists or running 
a special issue on alternatives to statistical data analysis) are likely food for thought and 
discussion amongst groups including authors and journals, and will require individuals with an 
interest to take up the challenge to design such proposals. 
 
Table 2: Change Proposals by Stage of the Hypothetico-Deductive Model to Science, differentiated by Level of Programming and Implementation 
Timeframe 
Stage of the 
hypothetico-
deductive 
research cycle 
Proposal Implementation 
timeframe  
 Level of 
programming  
Implicated outcome  Implicated 
stakeholders8 
1. Develop 
hypotheses 
Encourage different 
epistemic script as 
alternatives to 
hypothetico-deductive 
research. 
Short-term Weakly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threat #3 and emergent threat #2: it 
provides room for pluralistic and diverse modes of 
knowledge construction and theory generation (Grover & 
Lyytinen, 2015). 
A, R, J 
Enforce pre-registration of 
hypotheses prior to data 
analysis. 
Short-term Strongly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threat #4 and emergent threat #1: it 
minimizes risks from publication bias and HARKing 
(Warren, 2018). 
A, R, J 
2. Design study Change the top journals' 
contribution model to 
embrace replications of 
prior hypotheses as 
desired contributions. 
Long-term Weakly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threat #4 and emergent threat #1: it 
provides a stronger incentive for scholars to pursue 
reproducibility. 
J, P 
Pre-register replication 
studies. 
Long-term Strongly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threat #2 and #4: it maintains leeway 
for scientific creativity in original studies whilst enforcing 
strict rigor in replication studies (Gelman, 2015). 
J, P 
Encourage sequential 
testing designs. 
Short-term Weakly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threat #2 and #3: it promotes using 
multiple samples to test hypotheses (against alternatives 
where available) and implements a stage-gate model that 
stops when results do not continuously appear promising 
(Johnson et al., 2017). 
A, J 
                                                 
8  A = Authors, R = Reviewers/Editors, J = Journals/Publishers, P = Policy makers/Regulators 
3. Collect data Implement a results-blind 
review stage in journals 
prior to data collection. 
Long-term Strongly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threat #2, #4 and emergent threat #1: 
it minimizes risks from publication bias and p-Hacking 
and allows focusing the review on theory development 
and study design (Greve, Bröder, & Erdfelder, 2013). 
A, R, J 
Promote sharing of 
datasets in open 
repositories. 
Short-term Weakly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threat #2, #4 and emergent threat #1: 
it fosters replication, independent inspection, and data re-
use. 
A, R, J 
Require authors to 
conduct multi-site data 
collections. 
Short-term Strongly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threat #2, #3 and emergent threats #1 
and #2: it allows distinguishing data-independent 
confirmatory research for testing hypotheses from data-
contingent exploratory research for generating 
hypotheses. 
J, P 
4. Analyze data Run special issues on 
alternative quantitative 
analyses for theory testing 
research in IS. 
Long-term Weakly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threat #2, #3 and emergent threat #2: 
it fosters the development of novel inferential approaches 
that can be used in complementary or substitutive fashion 
with NHST, thereby adding value whilst eliminating the 
most egregious features (Matthews, 2019). 
R, J 
Require authors to 
confirm independent 
methodological quality 
assurance. 
Short-term Strongly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threat #1 and emergent threat #1: it 
protects against methodological shortcomings and 
encourages team science. 
A, J 
Eliminate NHST as an 
approach to data analysis. 
Short-term Strongly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threats #1, #2, #4 and emergent 
threat #2: it removes all vestiges of NHST, such as p-
values, significance cut-offs, statements of "significance" 
and so forth, until new, widely accepted ways of data 
analysis have been developed (Trafimow & Marks, 
2015). 
R, J, P 
5. Interpret 
results 
Develop reporting 
checklists. 
Long-term Weakly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threat #4 and emergent threat #1: 
Improves completeness and quality of reporting, ensures 
comparability across studies, and enables meta-analytic 
reviews (e.g., Shaw & Ertug, 2017). 
A, R, J 
Eliminate language 
around "statistical 
significance" in papers. 
Short-term Strongly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threats #1 and #4: it minimizes the 
risk for misinterpretation of NHST concepts and fosters 
more mindful interpretation of statistical results 
(Wasserstein et al., 2019). 
A, R, J 
6. Report 
findings 
Reward transparent, open 
and reproducible reporting 
(e.g., through open 
research badges)9. 
Short-term Weakly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threats #2, #4 and emergent threat 
#1: it provides recognition to authors and makes open 
science practices desirable. 
J, P 
Require authors to report 
the number of statistical 
tests conducted upon 
submission to journal. 
Short-term Strongly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threat #4 and emergent threat #1: 
Makes scholars more mindful of their own practices and 
allow readers to better assess the veracity and power of 
reported results (Goldfarb & King, 2016). 
J, P 
Build digital twins of 
entire research processes, 
decisions and outcomes. 
Long-term Weakly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threat #4 and emergent threat #1: it 
provides a more accurate, timely and complete 
description of the research process than the ex post 
crafting of a paper. 
A, P 
Encourage post-
publication reviews. 
Short-term Weakly 
programmed 
Mitigates traditional threats #3, #4 and emergent threat 
#1: it diversifies and extends peer review. 
R, J 
 
 
                                                 
9  See https://osf.io/tvyxz/wiki/home/ for more information on available types of open research badges.  
Putting the Foot Down: Two readily implementable Proposals  
On the individual stakeholder level: New guidelines for authors working on 
hypothetico-deductive IS research 
We now describe measures that one core stakeholder group, namely researchers/authors, can 
adopt today. Table 3 details new guidelines for IS scholars, consisting of three sets of 
recommendations, two to encourage (“Should do” and “Could do”) and one to discourage (“Must 
not do”) certain NHST-relevant practices. The combination of “Should, Could and Must not” 
forms a balanced checklist that helps researchers throughout all stages of the research cycle to 
protect themselves against cognitive biases (e.g., by pre-registering protocols or hypotheses), 
improve statistical mastery where possible (e.g., through consulting independent methodological 
advice) and become modest, humble, contextualized and transparent (Wasserstein et al., 2019) 
wherever possible (e.g., by following open science reporting guidelines and cross-checking 
terminology and argumentation).  
We make the distinction between “should do” and “could do” for two reasons. One, because 
some of the recommendations that scholars could opt to follow may not be applicable in all 
scenarios. For example, in research settings involving emergent technology or new, unexplored 
phenomena, directional hypotheses may be an appropriate way of developing new theory and 
sufficient information for alternative, more precisely formulated theories may not yet be 
available. Likewise, declaring a quantitative paper as theory-generating hinges on academic 
journals’ aptitude to consider such work as a welcomed mode of contribution. Two, several of 
the “could do” recommendations draw on emergent science practices that have not yet widely 
been implemented or tested. For example, a conclusive verdict is at this point not yet available 
about how effective pre-registration is or how it can best be integrated into the constructive, 
developmental reviewing practices that many our discipline’s journals adhere to (e.g., Saunders, 
2005; Saunders et al., 2017). 
Several of the “Must not” guidelines already exist in the form of educational materials or 
software solutions. For example, statistical power analysis can be performed using standalone 
tools (e.g., G*Power 3, Faul et al., 2007), and several tools exist to cross-check against p-
Hacking and reporting bias (e.g., Schönbrodt, 2018). Also in the “Should do” and “Could do” 
categories are several options already available (e.g., for pre-registration and reporting), such as 
the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) Statement 
(Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, Altman, & The PRISMA Group, 2009) relevant to correlational, 
observational studies or the Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) Statement 
(Begg et al., 1996) for experiments. It feels paradoxically both needless and important to point 
out that neither these nor other initiatives have yet found any substantial uptake in our 
community. For example, the Association for Information Systems has already launched a 
dedicated journal for replication (Saunders et al., 2017) and also is currently running a replication 
project (Dennis et al., 2018). Yet, the sheer existence of such outlets and initiatives that point out 
that particular scientific processes are “the right thing to do” is certainly necessary, but not 
sufficient.  
Readers following the debate about NHST over the years may also feel that several variants of 
the guidelines in Table 3 have been suggested before. Yet, as our analysis showed, these 
practices have not widely diffused into our own community routines, which is why we decided to 
present a very clear, instructive checklist of what always to do, what possibly to do, and what 
most certainly not to do. 
 
Table 3: New Guidelines for Hypothetico-Deductive IS Researchers. 
Stage of the 
hypothetico-
deductive cycle 
Should do Could do Must not do 
1. Develop 
hypotheses 
 Specify hypotheses that test competing 
theories (Burton-Jones et al., 2017; Gray 
& Cooper, 2010) or compare data to 
naïve models rather than null hypotheses 
(Schwab et al., 2011, p. 1114). 
 Specify hypotheses in non-point 
value or non-directional 
alternative forms (Edwards & 
Berry, 2010). 
 Pre-register hypotheses. 
 Declare hypotheses as a priori if they were conceived 
post data collection and/or analysis. 
2. Design study  Explicate sampling strategy. 
 Pre-register protocols and instruments. 
 Design studies for replications.  Use inference study designs for population-level data 
collections. 
 Under- or over-power your data collection. 
3. Collect data  Always run and report a priori statistical 
power analyses. 
 Share raw data in open data 
repositories. 
 Collect data without written approval from ethics 
review boards. 
4. Analyze data  Always conduct effect size analyses. 
 Always report test statistics together 
with standard errors and confidence 
intervals. 
 When using p-values, report them 
as continuous, descriptive 
quantities. 
 Engage in creative data analysis and p-value polishing. 
 Dichotomize results as statistically significant or not 
depending on whether the p-value is below or above the 
size α of the hypothesis test. 
 Use statistical significance to measure the size of an 
effect. 
5. Interpret 
results 
 Eliminate language around “statistical 
significance” (Gelman & Stern, 2006). 
 Report effect sizes. 
 Translate effect sizes back to real-world 
phenomena/measures to demonstrate 
practical significance. 
 Consult statisticians for 
independent methodological 
oversight and involve 
practitioners to cross-check 
practical relevance of results. 
 Base your conclusions solely on whether an association 
or effect was found to be “statistically significant” 
without considering effect sizes. 
 Conclude anything about scientific or practical 
importance based on statistical significance or lack 
thereof (Lee et al., 2017). 
6. Report 
findings 
 Distinguish between a priori 
expectations and post-hoc inferences. 
 Use reporting checklists (McNutt, 2016). 
 Declare your paper as theory-
generating when hypothesizing 
after the results were known. 
 Follow open science reporting 
guidelines (Nosek et al., 2015). 
 Hide, downplay or exclude unexpected or “non-
significant” results, or non-results. 
 
On the collective (institutional) level: Diversifying the peer review and publication 
process 
A second set of practical and achievable steps we wish to explicate is for the entire IS research 
community to embrace the open science culture (Nosek et al., 2015), which recognizes 
transparency, openness, and reproducibility as vital values of scientific endeavor. Our stake is 
that IS research should not be a laggard in embracing open science ideas, it should be a leader 
and early adopter: the open science movement has since 2014 strongly embraced the possibilities 
offered by digital, networked platforms and readily available online infrastructure to implement 
ideas that go back hundreds of years (David, 2004). Open science promotes openness across the 
entire hypothetico-deductive cycle through (a) design standards that increase transparency about 
the research process and reduce vague or incomplete reporting, (b) open standards for sharing 
research materials, (c) data sharing standards that incentivize authors to make data available in 
trusted repositories. 
This movement has made it possible, and over recent years also technologically feasible, to 
decouple two functions that have long been confounded: dissemination and evaluation of 
research (Munafò et al., 2017). Dissemination and evaluation has traditionally been a joint 
function of academic journals, however, dissemination can now be controlled independently 
from evaluation, or they could be loosely and temporally coupled at various stages and in various 
formats. For example, preprint services allow for dissemination of information to the research 
community at any stage of the research process. Online journals allow temporally decoupling 
peer reviews from the dissemination lifecycle (e.g., by substituting or complementing pre-
publication peer review with post-publication peer reviews).  
This move is not intended as a way to publish any research at any time. Instead, it opens 
possibilities for the harvesting of feedback from peers during the construction of a study or its 
reporting. It also frees journals to trial alternative review models, such as results-free review 
(Button, Bal, Clark, & Shipley, 2016) or post-publication reviews (publons, 2017). 
Table 4 demonstrates how the peer review and publication process across the stages of the 
hypothetico-deductive research cycle could be decoupled and expanded. It also lists new digital 
services that are already available to IS researchers but which, to the best of our knowledge, are 
not widely used. For purposes of illustration, therefore, we have taken steps wherever possible to 
use these services as they apply to this paper (see rightmost column). During that process, we 
immediately noticed several notable changes: first, being open by design undermined the double-
blind peer review process (which is why we consulted with the senior editor prior to making 
these moves). Second, we were surprised about the sophisticated ways in which the open 
repositories, through standardized reporting protocols and interfaces, disseminated the various 
knowledge elements (data, protocols, paper versions) across different platforms (e.g., from open 
science registries to ResearchGate, ORCID and other platforms), and also how readily these 
moves found their way into academic conversations– we received platform, email and twitter 
inquires about this paper already during the review process just 24h after we posted a pre-print 
version on an open science server.10 We are not ideologists and we are aware that there are both 
upsides and risks to being open during (not after) the reporting and peer review process, but we 
note that there is already evidence that open peer review improves the quality of reviews (Walsh, 
Rooney, Appleby, & Wilkinson, 2000) and that studies using pre-registered protocols markedly 
report more null findings (Warren, 2018). Both are laudable outcomes, in our view, that justify 
experimenting with these ideas. 
 
                                                 
10  To illustrate, consider this tweet from June 3, 2019: “Discussion on the #statisticalSignificance has 
reached ISR. "Null hypothesis significance testing in quantitative IS research: a call to reconsider our 
practices [submission to a second AIS Senior Scholar Basket of 8 Journal, received Major Revisions]" a 
new paper by @janrecker” (https://twitter.com/AgloAnivel/status/1135466967354290176). 
Table 4: A diversified model of the peer review and publication process, by stage of the scientific process, with examples. 
Stage of the 
hypothetico-
deductive 
scientific 
process 
Form of 
reporting 
Suitable 
outlets 
Type of 
review 
Examples Form of reporting perused for 
this paper 
Pre-data 
collection 
Publication of 
pre-data 
collection 
theory and 
research 
design 
IS 
conferences 
Conference-
level peer 
review 
Main IS conferences such as ICIS (“short 
papers”), ECIS and PACIS (“research-in-
progress papers), or AMCIS (“emergent research 
forum papers”) accept pre-data collection 
research-in-progress reports as a type of 
submission.11 
Not used. 
Pre-data 
collection 
Pre-
registration of 
protocols 
Open 
protocol 
repository 
Moderation, 
no peer 
review 
 Clinical trial protocols in medicine, e.g., 
(Lenzer, Hoffman, Furberg, & Ioannidis, 
2013) 
 Open Science Foundation Registries 
https://osf.io/registries 
 Center for Open Science Preregistration 
https://cos.io/prereg/ 
The literature coding scheme is 
uploaded at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17605/OSF.I
O/2GKCS.  
Disclosure of 
ethics 
approval 
Ethics 
approval 
database 
Ethics board 
review 
E.g., the Research Ethics Application Database 
https://tread.tghn.org/  
Not applicable. 
Pre-data 
analysis 
Publication of 
raw data 
Open data 
repositories 
None  http://datadryad.org/12 (cross-disciplinary 
curated not-for-profit membership 
organization) 
Both raw and coded data are 
uploaded at 
https://doi.org/10.25912/5cede00
                                                 
11  Note that the reviewing of these submission types at IS conferences is not strongly programmed, in the sense that these conferences accept both pre- and post-data 
collection papers (as well as other types of reports) to be submitted and reviewed. 
12  Note that presently DataDryad does not have IS journals as registered outlets. 
 Research Data Finder (institution-level data 
service provided by Queensland University of 
Technology) 
24b1e1.  
Curation of 
research-in-
progress 
papers 
Web 
databases, 
galleries 
Conference-
level peer 
review 
Could be automatically harvested from galleries 
such as https://icis2018postergallery.weebly.com/ 
Not applicable. 
Pre-
interpretation 
Registration 
of “minimum 
replicable 
datasets”. 
Open data 
repositories 
Through 
independent 
methodology-
only 
reviewing 
 http://datadryad.org/ (cross-disciplinary 
curated not-for-profit membership 
organization) 
 Research Data Finder (institution-level data 
service provided by Queensland University of 
Technology) 
Both raw and coded data are 
uploaded at 
https://doi.org/10.25912/5cede00
24b1e1. 
Post-
interpretation 
Pre-review 
prints 
Repositories 
for electronic 
pre-prints 
Moderation 
but no peer 
review 
 arXiv, https://arXiv.org/ 
 SocArXiv, https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv 
 Social Science Research Network (SSRN) 
https://www.ssrn.com/13 
The complete manuscript version 
history (eight versions) is 
uploaded on SocArXiv at 
https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/5q
r7v.  Pre-
publication 
peer-review 
Traditional 
academic 
journals 
Editorial and 
peer review 
Any mainstream IS journal. 
Post-review Post-review 
pre-
publication 
Academic 
social 
networking 
sites 
Peer-level 
adoption and 
comments 
E.g., www.researchGate.net. ResearchGate automatically 
imported the manuscript 
(versions) from SocArXiv. We 
updated the metadata throughout 
the process. 
Post-
publication 
Publication 
meta data 
None E.g., PubMed in medicine (a free resource 
developed and maintained by the National Center 
Not applicable. 
                                                 
13  Note that SSRN has been bought by the publisher Elsevier in July 2016. 
registration repositories for Biotechnology Information at the U.S. 
National Library of Medicine): 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/ 
Post-
publication 
review 
Online 
academic 
journals 
Peer review  E.g., the Australasian Journal in Information 
Systems (e.g., Burmeister, 2016) 
 E.g., PubMed Commons in medicine14 
 E.g., Publons (publons, 2017) 
Not (yet) available at the time of 
writing. 
 
                                                 
14  Note that PubMed Commons has been discontinued because of the low level of participation, with comments submitted on only 6,000 of the 28 million articles indexed 
in PubMed (NCBI Insights, 2018). 
Finally, by demonstrating in Table 4 how readily available this way of diversifying our 
dissemination and reviewing practices is to our community, we also wish to call out how the 
growing advent of the open science movement itself is entirely a digitally enabled and embodied 
phenomenon: open science processes and outcomes build on digital platforms, digital 
referencing, open interfaces, data exchange standards, and large-scale online databases. We ask, 
why are we not pushing the further development of these platforms and the practices they afford, 
why are we not studying these developments in much greater detail and volume, and why are we 
not yet broad adopters? 
Conclusion 
In this paper we developed new guidelines for the application of NHST in hypothetico-deductive 
IS research. We are not idealists. We know that breaking or changing routinized practices is 
difficult. We also know that like the other papers in the broader conversation of this proud IS 
research tradition, ours may raise more questions than it answers. For example, one of the most 
fundamental questions is whether the changes we propose will ultimately improve the robustness, 
validity and efficiency of our research. We tried to be forward looking and balanced in proposing 
several courses of actions, distinguished by level of programming and implementation 
timeframe. This way, it will be up to us as a community to decide whether we want to change 
directions by incentivizing ways we deem promising, or by implementing safeguards against 
ways of working we deem no longer acceptable. We do not believe either way is correct on its 
own. But if we can agree on experimenting on the right balance between encouragement and 
discouragement, we can allow our proud research tradition to continue to prosper. 
We also tried to be assertive. Many of the issues we discussed have been discussed before but 
what is new is that there are now more pervasive elements of the threats, their implications, and 
generally a sense of what is not working, so the time is opportune to renew the call – and change 
the tone. We developed two sets of practical and achievable steps ready to be adopted 
straightaway. But even if these suggestions will only lead to counter-proposals being made and 
perhaps implemented, then we see value in our proposal toward the ultimate aim of ensuring that 
IS research remains unbiased, rigorous, meaningful and relevant. 
We are also of course ourselves “guilty as we charge”. Personally, we have also in the past 
employed the same institutionalized practices like others in our community and we are very 
mindful that our own practices of NHST and the reporting in our own papers are just as 
susceptible to threats such as those we identified in our sample. At the same time, we are also 
adamant in our own stance to change the situation to the better. We are astutely aware of the 
mantra “walk our own talk”. We have in the past organized seminars to educate students and 
researchers on the correct use of NHST. We have written a textbook on this topic (Mertens, 
Pugliese, & Recker, 2017). Where possible, we have already implemented several of the 
proposals we make in this paper, including sharing of datasets, pre-registering study protocols, 
disclosing the history of research and publication process changes and so forth, not only in this 
paper but also in others we were involved with in recent times. 
Finally, we were not meaning to write an overly critical contribution. We do not mean to revive 
the IS anxiety debate (Grover, Straub, & Galluch, 2009). Where possible, we partake in the 
development of our own field. One matter that is dear to us in this context is that with our 
analysis of IS scholarship in this paper we do not mean to criticize our colleagues for how they 
constructed their articles. Science is a social endeavor and published articles are a poor 
representation of this complex process that involves negotiations between authors, reviewers and 
editors, which means that if there are potentially harmful habits that formed in this process, we as 
the entire ecosystem of IS scholars must work together to achieve change. We hope our proposal 
will help us engage in healthy periodical reviewing, constant self-reflection, critical self-
assessment, and continuous improvement so that IS research can continue blending rigorous 
conduct, brilliant hypothesizing and the necessary quantity of good luck to continue to prosper. 
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Appendix A: Literature Review Procedures 
Identification of Papers 
In our intention to demonstrate “open science” practices (Locascio, 2019; Nosek, Ebersole, C., & 
Mellor, 2018; Warren, 2018) we preregistered our research procedures using the Open Science 
Framework “Registries” (doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/2GKCS).  
We proceeded as follows: We identified the 100 top cited papers (per year) between 2013 and 
2016 in the senior scholar basket of eight IS journals using Harzing’s Publish or Perish version 6 
(Harzing, 2010). We ran the queries separately on 7 February 2017 and then aggregated the 
results to identify the 100 most cited papers (based on citations per year) across the basket of 
eight journals.15 The raw data (together with the coded data) is available at an open data 
repository hosted by Queensland University of Technology (doi:10.25912/5cede0024b1e1). 
We identified from this set of papers those that followed the hypothetico-deductive model. First, 
we excluded 48 papers that did not involve empirical data: 31 papers that offered purely 
theoretical contributions, 11 that were commentaries in the form of forewords, introductions to 
special issues or editorials, five methodological essays, and one design science paper. Second, we 
identified from these 52 papers those that reported on collection and analysis of quantitative data. 
We found 46 such papers; of these, 39 were traditional quantitative research articles, three were 
essays on methodological aspects of quantitative research, two studies employed mixed method 
designs involving quantitative empirical data and two design science papers that involved 
quantitative data. Third, we eliminated from this set the three methodological essays as the focus 
of these papers was not on developing and testing new theory to explain and predict IS 
                                                 
.15  Our query terms were: [Management Information Systems Quarterly OR MIS Quarterly OR MISQ], 
[European Journal of Information Systems OR EJIS], [Information Systems Journal OR IS Journal OR ISJ], 
[Information Systems Research OR ISR], [Journal of the Association for Information Systems OR Journal 
of the AIS OR JAIS], [Journal of Information Technology OR Journal of IT OR JIT], [Journal of 
Management Information Systems OR Journal of MIS OR JMIS], [Journal of Strategic Information 
Systems OR Journal of SIS OR JSIS]. We checked for and excluded inaccurate results, such as papers from 
MISQ Executive, EJIS European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, etc. 
phenomena. This resulted in a final sample of 43 papers, including two design science and two 
mixed method studies.  
Coding of Papers 
We developed a coding scheme in an excel repository to code the studies. The repository is 
available in our OSF registry. We used the following criteria. Where applicable, we refer to 
literature that defined the variables we used during coding.  
- What is the main method of data collection and analysis (e.g., experiment, meta-analysis, 
panel, social network analysis, survey, text mining, economic modeling, multiple)? 
- Are testable hypotheses or propositions proposed (yes/in graphical form only/no)? 
- How precisely are the hypotheses formulated (using the classification of Edwards & 
Berry, 2010)? 
- Is null-hypothesis significance testing used (yes/no)? 
- Are exact p-values reported (yes/all/some/not at all)? 
- Are effect sizes reported and, if so, which ones primarily (e.g., R², standardized means 
difference scores, f², partial eta²)? 
- Are results declared as “statistically significant” (yes/sometimes/not at all)? 
- How many hypotheses are reported as supported (%)? 
- Are p-values used to argue the absence of an effect (yes/no)? 
- Are confidence intervals for test statistics reported (yes/selectively/no)? 
- What sampling method is used (i.e., convenient/random/systematic sampling, entire 
population)?16 
                                                 
16  We used the definitions by Creswell (2009, p. 148): random sampling means each unit in the population has 
an equal probability of being selected; systematic sampling means that specific characteristics are used to 
stratify the sample such that the true proportion of units in the studied population is reflected; and 
convenience sampling means that a nonprobability sample of available or accessible units is used. 
- Is statistical power discussed and if so, where and how (e.g., sample size estimation, ex-
post power analysis)? 
- Are competing theories tested explicitly (Gray & Cooper, 2010)? 
- Are corrections made to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing, where applicable (e.g., 
Bonferroni, alpha-inflation, variance inflation)? 
- Are post-hoc analyses reported for unexpected results? 
 
We also extracted quotes that in our interpretation illuminated the view taken on NHST in the 
paper. This was important for us to demonstrate the imbuement of practices in our research 
routines and the language used in using key NHST phrases such as “statistical significance” or 
“p-value” (Gelman & Stern, 2006).  
To be as unbiased as possible, we hired a research assistant to perform the coding of papers. 
Before he commenced coding, we explained the coding scheme to him during several meetings. 
We then conducted a pilot test to evaluate the quality of his coding: the research assistant coded 
five random papers from the set of papers and we met to review the coding by comparing our 
different individual understandings of the papers. Where inconsistencies arose, we clarified the 
coding scheme with him until we were confident he understood it thoroughly. During the coding, 
the research assistant highlighted particular problematic or ambiguous coding elements and we 
met and resolved these ambiguities to arrive at a shared agreement. The coding process took 
three months to complete. The results of our coding are openly accessible at 
doi:10.25912/5cede0024b1e1. Appendix A1 provides some summary statistics about our sample. 
 
Appendix A1. Selected descriptive statistics on 43 often cited IS papers from 2013-2016 
Main method for data 
collection and analysis 
Experiment 5 
Meta-analysis 2 
 Panel 5 
 Social network analysis 4 
 Survey 15 
 Text mining 5 
 Economic modeling 1 
 Multiple 6 
Empirical data Newly collected or analyzed primary data  40 
 Re-analyzed or secondary data 3 
Hypotheses Testable hypotheses or propositions proposed 38 
 No testable hypotheses or propositions proposed 5 
 Average percentage of hypotheses per study that were supported by the data  82 % 
Statement of hypotheses As relations 0 
 As upper/lower limits 0 
 As directions 13 
 In non-nil form 0 
 In functional form 0 
 In contingent form 2 
 As comparisons 6 
 In multiple ways 15 
 Not formulated 2 
 Not applicable 5 
NHST Uses NHST techniques or terminology 42 
 Does not use NHST techniques or terminology 1 
Exact p-values Reports exact p-values 3 
 Reports exact p-values selectively 8 
 Reports indicators for different levels of statistical significance 28 
 Does not report p-values 3 
Inverse use of p-values Uses p-values to point at absence of an effect or accept the null hypothesis 11 
 Does not use p-values to point at absence of effect or accept null hypothesis 29 
 Not applicable  3 
‘Statistical’ significance Does not explicitly refer to ‘statistical significance’ 23 
 Consistently refers to ‘statistical significance’ 3 
 Selectively refers to ‘statistical significance’ 16 
 Not applicable 1 
Effect sizes Reports R² measures  26 
 Reports mean difference score measures  2 
 Reports multiple effect size measures 4 
 Does not report effect size measures 10 
 Not applicable 1 
Confidence intervals Reports confidence intervals consistently 3 
 Reports confidence intervals selectively 2 
 Reports confidence intervals for bootstrapping results (no p-value available) 3 
 Does not report confidence intervals 34 
 Not applicable 1 
Sampling Convenient  22 
 Systematic 6 
 Random 4 
 Entire population 8 
 Not applicable 3 
Competing Theories Tested explicitly 7 
 Not tested 35 
 Not applicable 1 
A posteriori analyses Provided 11 
 Not provided 31 
 Not applicable 1 
 
 
